2013-14 Kansas Jayhawks: Their best and worst games
One of the Jayhawks' strengths let them down in some bad performances, and a common offensive problem doomed them at the end of the season.
This is the second of 4 articles about the 2013-14 Kansas Jayhawks. Read the intro article to the team here. Upcoming are:
· Their rotation and the impact of key players (Jan 25)
· Offensive and defensive style (Feb 1)
First, my apologies to subscribers….I had this article drafted but never actually scheduled it to send. So, you’ll be getting 2 articles on Kansas’s 2013-14 team today.
One of my favorite ways to really understand past teams is to look at what made the difference between their best games and their worst games. What did the team miss most in the bad games? What was the thing that propelled them to their best? Sometimes it’s a rotation change, or a specific area of the game that’s unlocked by certain matchups.
The 2013-14 Kansas Jayhawks had some highs and lows. They didn’t have any extreme streaks of good or bad play; in fact, sometimes their best games came right after their worst, and vice versa. They even had one of their best games and one of their worst games against the same opponent. Before we get into what made the difference, let’s identify their worst and best games.
I’m defining best/worst games by adjusted scoring margin per possession. This divids the game margin by the number of possessions, and then adjusts according to the opponent’s per-possession KenPom rating that season. So, a huge blowout of a below-average team might not rank as high as a solid double-digit win over a strong team. I’m also giving a bonus for winning on the road (4.5 pts/100 poss). Lastly, I exclude garbage time from this; the precise cutoffs I use for garbage time can be found here.
By this metric, the Jayhawks best games were:
Nov 12 vs Duke (+11, 76 possessions)
Jan 11 vs Kansas State (+26, 59 poss)
Feb 4 vs Baylor (+17, 67 poss)
Feb 22 vs Texas (+31, 65 poss)
Mar 5 vs Texas Tech (+25, 65 poss)
For these games, Kansas posted an adjusted margin of +53 points per 100 possessions. They scored 127 points per 100 possessions and allowed 90. They were excellent at defensive rebounding, getting 74% of opponent misses. That’s above their season average of 71%, but this is made even more impressive by the fact that several of these opponents (Baylor, Texas, Texas Tech) were among the top 10 offensive rebounding teams in the country. Kansas’ defensive rebound rate was 12% above what these teams allowed for the season. The Jayhawks easily outshot their opponents, with a 58% eFG% compared to 42% for their opponents. They also avoided turnovers, committing them on only 13% of possessions (well below their season average of 19%).
The worst games for the Jayhawks were:
Nov 28 vs Wake Forest (+9, 73 poss)
Nov 30 vs UTEP (+4, 65 poss)
Feb 1 vs Texas (-12, 69 poss)
Mar 8 vs West Virginia (-6, 72 poss)
Mar 14 vs Iowa State (-11, 75 poss)
Mar 23 vs Stanford (-3, 70 poss)
You may have noticed they actually won 2 of those games, but I am considering those in the worst performance ahead of 6 other Kansas losses. That is because those wins were against teams ranked 117th (Wake) and 103rd (UTEP) in the nation by KenPom. Barely beating that bad of a team is a bad sign.
In these 6 games, Kansas posted an adjusted margin of +4 points per 100 possessions. They scored 105 points per 100 possessions and allowed 111. Their defensive rebounding was poor, as they collected only 63% of opponent misses. That’s 4% fewer than those opponents combined to allow on the season. Kansas was outshot, posting a 45% effective FG% compared to 52% for their opponents.
Transition Defense and Halfcourt Offense were the keys
It’s intriguing that one of their best performaces came against Texas, 3 weeks after one of their worst performances against the same Texas team. The Jayhawks were handled easily in Austin but rebounded to blow out the Longhorns on the return trip to Lawrence.
A big part of the story was transition offense and defense. For the season, Kansas had a big advantage in transition. While the Jayhawks didn’t run much (150th in shots in transition at 22% ), they were excellent when they did, ranking 23rd in effective FG% in these spots at 62%. They were excellent at limiting transition, allowing less than 18% of opponent shots to come in transition (10th nationally) and the 53rd best eFG% in these spots at 47%.
In the first matchup against Texas, the Jayhawks did their usual thing, taking 25% of their shots in transition and hitting 60%. But they were uncharacteristically bad in transition, allowing the Longhorns to take 29% of their shots there and hit 69%. In the return match, Kansas clearly focused better on their strength, limiting Texas to just 18% of their shots in transition and a miniscule 23% effective FG%. The Kansas transition offense was just about as good as it had been the first game, with 30% of their shots coming in transition and hitting 72%. while the transition offense was consistent, transition defense was the wild card.
A similar effect happened in halfcourt offense between the two games. While Texas posted a 38% eFG% in halfcourt offense both games, Kansas went from 36% in their loss to 48% in their win. They key was their accuracy inside the arc; Kansas hit 31% of their twos the first game but 48% the second. Andrew Wiggins and Joel Embiid were largely the culprits, as they combined to take 12 2 point jumpers and hit but 1. They improved to 4 of 7 in the second matchup, and worked to get teammates shots at the rim (4 of 7, up from 1 of 4 in the loss). Kansas played a slower paced game the second go-round against Texas, with 64 possessions vs 69 the first game, but did a better job of working for quality shots in halfcourt offense instead of quicker midrange jumpers. In the first matchup Kansas took 25 shots between 11 and 20 seconds into the shot clock, and just 4 after 20 seconds. In the more patient second matchup, they took 13 shots between 11-20 seconds and 12 after 20 seconds. All of Wiggins and Embiid’s 13 shots in the first matchup in halfcourt offense came under 20 seconds into the clock, but they did a much better job of getting teammates involved
This was a common differentiator between good and bad games through much of the season: at their best, Kansas was suffocating in transition defense and patient in halfcourt offense. Duke, Kansas State, and Baylor managed to take 23% of their shots in transition and hit 32% during the Jayhawks best games; Wake Forest and UTEP were at 39% and 63%. Amazingly, Kansas’ halfcourt defense was actually better in the Wake Forest and UTEP games where they played worse overall; Kansas allowed them a 39% eFG% and a 48% eFG% to Duke, Kansas State, and Baylor.
Doomed by impatience
Joel Embiid was missing for the last 6 games of the season due to a back injury. During this stretch, Kansas played 1 of their best games (Mar 5 vs Texas Tech) but also 3 of their worst (Mar 8 vs west Virginia, Mar 14 vs Iowa State, Mar 23 vs Stanford). The transition defense kinks had been ironed out, as the Jayhawks were very good in this facet in all 4 games. Offensive impatience was the big factor that hurt them.
Most teams shoot a lower percentage on shots later in the shot clock, due to the simple fact that as the clock runs down players force up shots. Kansas, however, actually had a better eFG% after 20 seconds had passed (54%) than earlier in the clock in halfcourt offense (52%). One likely factor was that Kansas had a number of very good isolation scorers; per Synergy, the team was in the 96th percentile on scoring in isolation. Late in the shot clock, you need players who can break down the defense on their own, and that’s what Kansas had. Frank Mason ranked in the 100th percentile himself on isos, with Naadir Tharpe (96th) Perry Ellis (81st), and Wayne Selden (73rd) all rating as Excellent or Very Good. Andrew Wiggins was rated as Good (61st percentile) and was the weakest of their 5 main iso scorers; that’s a great situation to have as a team!
What this meant is that Kansas had the luxury to hunt for great shots, knowing that they had several scorers who could get a good look late in the clock. The opportunity cost of taking a shot earlier in the clock is the value of later ones, and Kansas could get a lot of value later. Their strategy should have been to run their offense and look for the best shots: good looks at the rim or open threes. If those weren’t there, initiatie their late clock offense with one of their strong scorers.
Against Texas Tech on March 5th, Kansas did that. Of their shots between 11-20 seconds in the clock, 44% were threes. Kansas took 16 shots between 11-20 seconds and 12 shots after 20 seconds, showing a good amount of patience. Andrew Wiggins only took 2 shots between 11-20 seconds, showing solid discipline and getting his teammates involved.
In their 3 bad games late in the season, they most certainly did not do this. Kansas took 78 shots in the 3 games between 11-20 seconds and just 23 after 20 seconds, showing an alarming lack of patience on offense. They took more midrange shots than any other type between 11-20 seconds, with 29 from there compared to 24 from three and 25 at the rim. They had a 42% eFg% on shots between 11-20 seconds and 46% after 20 seconds, indicating that they were not taking high value shots earlier in the clock. Andrew Wiggins himself took 16 shots between 11-20 seconds compared to 8 later in the clock. He took more midrange shots early in the clock in these games (8) than all but 3 of his teammates took total shots early in the clock.
For much of the 2013-14 season, Kansas’ poor performances came when their strength in transition defense and defensive rebounding vanished. Both of these areas are more about focus and effort than they are about a particular skill, and it seems like the Jayhawks shored this up by the end of the season. However, a season-long bugaboo around offensive patience and shot selection continued to creep up and doom them. With one of their stars injured, Kansas couldn’t afford to slip into forcing quick shots and forfeiting their ability to get good shots even with the shot clock winding down. When the games mattered most, however, that’s just what happened, and the Jayhawks were sent packing in both their conference tournament and the NCAA Tournament far earlier than their reputation suggested.
In my next Hoops Hindsight, I’ll look at the Jayhawk rotation and how it evolved during the season.